Oxford Cambridge and RSA

Thursday 23 May 2024 – Morning

A Level History A

Y315/01 The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945

Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes

You must have:
- the OCR 12–page Answer Booklet

INSTRUCTIONS
- Use black ink.
- Write your answer to each question in the Answer Booklet. The question numbers must be clearly shown.
- Fill in the boxes on the front of the Answer Booklet.
- Answer the question in Section A and **any two** questions in Section B.

INFORMATION
- The total mark for this paper is **80**.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets **[ ]**.
- Quality of extended response will be assessed in questions marked with an asterisk (*).
- This document has **4** pages.

ADVICE
- Read each question carefully before you start your answer.

© OCR 2024 [F/506/4302]
DC (CE) 343759/3
OCR is an exempt Charity

SECTION A

Read the **two** passages and answer Question 1.

1 Evaluate the interpretations in **both** of the two passages.

Explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of Confederate generalship during the American Civil War. **[30]**

Passage A

Many charges have been brought against Confederate military leadership. It is often claimed that while the South had brilliant tactical leaders, it produced no generals who rose to the level of strategic vision demonstrated by Grant and Sherman. Robert E. Lee has particularly come in for criticism. His strategic vision, it has been claimed, was limited to the Virginia theatre, where his influence concentrated Confederate resources at the expense of the Western theatres. The result was that the Confederacy lost the West – and thus lost the war. The Western Confederate armies also suffered from inept generalship.

The Confederacy's command structure in the West was also a problem. There was an impossible tangle of authority and direction, so much so that it was not always clear who was in command. Internal feuds among the Western generals did not help matters. The result was that Confederate armies failed to develop a co-ordinated defence. President Davis ultimately bears responsibility for the overlapping command structure. He has also been blamed for interfering too much in military matters and for being responsible for feuds that built up between himself and commanders.

Confederate commanders are also charged with being too offensive-minded. It can be argued that the Confederacy literally bled itself to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks and losing their bravest men. It can be claimed that the Confederacy should not have tried to fight a conventional war at all. Perhaps if it had relied more on guerrilla warfare, it might have eroded the Northern will to fight.

A. Farmer, The American Civil War 1861–1865, published in 1996.

© OCR 2024

Passage B

The American Civil War saw elements of Napoleonic leadership. This was more apparent in terms of high command, in the generalship of Robert E. Lee, the most important commander of the Confederate forces. Like Napoleon, Lee found himself with smaller forces. He too forged a strong personal bond with his men, who saw him in the early years of the war as invincible. His defence of the South from the invasions launched by the North showed a mastery of the battlefield. Lee's strategy of defending Richmond while sending fast-moving forces into the Shenandoah Valley was effective in preventing the North from using superior numbers to take Richmond.

A daring attack into Northern territory in 1863 distracted the North from its attacks and Lee was able to withdraw in good order and escape Union attempts to cut his forces off from the South. It showed that the South was capable of attack and able to withstand a heavy Union attack and still outmanoeuvre the North. Lee's defensive action in 1863 to prevent a heavy Union invasion was also brilliantly conducted.

Lee, like Napoleon, had an eye for the battlefield; he divided his forces effectively and inspired confidence by some bold strategic and tactical decisions. He also displayed effective defensive leadership. However, he found that frontal assaults on well-established positions and the continuing loss of manpower against enemies with greater human resources eroded his reputation.

The battle of Gettysburg was his greatest failure. However, his image as a military gentleman was impressive.

M. Wells and N. Fellows, The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792-1945, published in 2016.

© OCR 2024

SECTION B

Answer any **two** questions.

2* ‘The concept of ‘Total War’ can only be used to describe twentieth century wars.’

How far do you agree with this view of the period from 1792 to 1945? **[25]**

3* ‘Throughout the period from 1792 to 1945 military plans had little impact on the outcome of wars.’

How far do you agree? **[25]**

4* ‘The mobilisation of the economy for war has been more important in the period from 1866 to 1945 than in the period from 1792 to 1866.’

How far do you agree? **[25]**

END OF QUESTION PAPER

OCR
Oxford Cambridge and RSA

Copyright Information

OCR is committed to seeking permission to reproduce all third-party content that it uses in its assessment materials. OCR has attempted to identify and contact all copyright holders whose work is used in this paper. To avoid the issue of disclosure of answer-related information to candidates, all copyright acknowledgements are reproduced in the OCR Copyright Acknowledgements Booklet. This is produced for each series of examinations and is freely available to download from our public website (www.ocr.org.uk) after the live examination series.

If OCR has unwittingly failed to correctly acknowledge or clear any third-party content in this assessment material, OCR will be happy to correct its mistake at the earliest possible opportunity.

For queries or further information please contact The OCR Copyright Team, The Triangle Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA.

OCR is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, which is itself a department of the University of Cambridge.

© OCR 2024